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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
In the ongoing case in the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL” or “Special

Court”) against Issa Hassan Sesay (“Sesay”), the parties have raised an important issue in
international criminal evidence: the admissibility of acts and declarations of a coconspirator in international criminal law. Sesay had offered to work with the prosecution
and become a witness for them against his co-conspirators. In the process, he has made
statements to the prosecution relating to the charges against his co-conspirators and
himself. Despite this cooperation, he has not actually become a witness. The prosecution
would now like to use the statements he made as admissible evidence in the trials against
Sesay and his co-conspirators.
Sesay and his two co-defendants, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, are charged
with eighteen counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity for their roles in Sierra
Leone’s civil war that has been waging since 1996. 1 They were each indicted separately
in early 2003 2 , but the court agreed with the prosecution’s motion to join the cases in
early 2004. 3 The Special Court now refers to their trial as the RUF trial, which began on
5 July 2004. 4 The following memorandum seeks to find a solution to the use of Sesay’s
testimony in the RUF trial for the Special Court. The memorandum will do so by

1

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL – 2004 – 15 – T, AMENDED CONSOLIDATED INDICTMENT, The
Special Court of Sierra Leone (May 13, 2004). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A,
at Tab 15.)
2

Information found at http://www.sc-sl.org/RUF.html, last accessed on 13 April 2005.

3

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL – 2004 – 15 – T, SUMMARY OF DECISION OF THE TRIAL
CHAMBER ON PROSECUTION PRELIMINARY MOTIONS FOR JOINDER, THE Special Court for Sierra Leone (Jan.
27, 2004). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 14.)
4

Information found at http://www.sc-sl.org/RUF.html, supra n. 2.
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analyzing the hearsay and self-incrimination aspects of the issue and comparing them to
existing rules and international norms.

A.

Issue

This question involves first, the use of Sesay’s testimony against his codefendants and second, the use of his testimony against himself. In determining the
ambit of the rules in the Special Court, the examination of these issues will include a look
at other international tribunals, as well as the major leading common law countries of the
world. Although these issues would be addressed as hearsay and self-incrimination in the
United States of America’s legal system, the international legal system deals with the
issues differently.
These issues will be discussed by making a comparative analysis to other
international tribunals trying war crimes and the International Criminal Court. Some
emphasis will be placed on the International Criminal Tribunals of Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
and Rwanda (“ICTR”), but due to the brevity in the cases, more examples and definitions
can be found in major common law countries. The United States of America, Canada,
and Australia are all current or former British territories, just like Sierra Leone. It is well
accepted that these three common law countries each have complex and well litigated
laws and rules of evidence, allowing them to be good candidates for comparison to the
Special Court.

2

B.

Summary of Conclusions
1.

Statements Made by an Individual Against His Coconspirators Are Admissible as Evidence in International
Criminal Law.

It is difficult to determine if the statements and evidence given by Sesay would
qualify as hearsay or valid testimony.

The distinction, however, is most likely

unnecessary because the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Rules of Evidence do not
contain a rule excluding hearsay.

Other United Nations (“U.N.”) created criminal

tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, also do not contain exceptions for evidence that could be
considered hearsay. Additionally, the United States’ Federal Rules of Evidence contain
an exception to the hearsay rule for statements made by a co-conspirator. Many other
international jurisdictions also contain a similar provision, thus allowing such statements
as valid evidence in a criminal case. Should the prosecution decide to use testimony
given by Sesay against his co-conspirators, the admissibility is still at the discretion of the
judge for relevancy but would not be barred by other evidence rules.

2.

Statements Made by a Co-conspirator Are Admissible as
Evidence Against Him- or Herself in International Criminal
Law, Provided That the Testimony Was Not Coerced or
Forced by the Prosecution.

Provided that the statements or other testimony are not coerced from the
defendant, self-incriminating evidence is admissible in most, if not all, legal jurisdictions.
Rules against self-incrimination were created as a protection for the defendant; however,
the defendant waives this protection when he gives testimony willingly. The SCSL Rules
of Evidence are based on the Rules of Evidence for the ICTY and ICTR. Each of these
sets of rules, including those for the other tribunals, contains a self-incrimination

3

provision from coerced testimony. In Sesay’s case, as long as the prosecution did not
compel his testimony, he impliedly waived this privilege when he willingly spoke about
the crimes he and his co-conspirators allegedly committed.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Sierra Leone has been at civil war for several decades, however the most

egregious acts have been committed since both sides signed a ceasefire agreement in
November 1996. 5 The Special Court was created to try the worst offenders of these war
crimes with an agreement between the U.N. and the national government of Sierra
Leone. 6 This Special Court is different than the other criminal tribunals the U.N. has
previously created. The SCSL is a hybrid court based on international law, other existing
war crimes tribunals, Sierra Leonean national domestic law, and elsewhere. It was
established because the war-torn domestic courts could not handle any of the impending
war crimes cases, but President Kabbah still wanted Sierra Leonean participation in the
prosecutions of the offenders. 7 Now pending in the SCSL is the case against Sesay and
his co-conspirators.

5

Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL – 2003 – 05 – I, INDICTMENT, The Special Court for Sierra Leone
(Mar. 3, 2003) ¶ 6. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 13.)
6

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N.–Sierra Leone, ¶ 1. (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 2.)
7

Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 299 (2003). (Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 51.)

4

The prosecutor for the SCSL charged Sesay with seventeen counts of crimes
against humanity in March 2003. 8 Each of these counts is in direct violation of the
Statute for the Special Court or Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and its
additional Protocol II. 9

In early 2004, the Chamber for the court granted the

prosecution’s motion for joinder for the trials of Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine
Gbao of the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”). 10 Presumably, these are now the coconspirators that Sesay would like to testify against. A consolidated indictment was then
submitted by the prosecutor charging all three men with eighteen acts of war. 11 The
latest developments in the case against Sesay during the first two months of 2005 include
a ruling on his appearance in court 12 and the prosecution’s request for leave to call
witnesses. 13
The remainder of this memorandum will analyze the prosecution’s ability to use
the statements and testimony given by Sesay to the prosecution, in both the case against

8

Prosecutor v. Sesay, INDICTMENT, supra n. 5. These charges include terrorizing the civilian population
and collective punishments, unlawful killings, sexual violence, physical violence, use of child soldiers,
abductions and forced labor, looting and burning, and attacks on UNAMSIL personnel.

9

Id.

10

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., SUMMARY OF DECISION
PRELIMINARY MOTIONS FOR JOINDER, supra n. 3.

OF THE

TRIAL CHAMBER

ON

PROSECUTION

11

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., AMENDED CONSOLIDATED INDICTMENT, supra n. 1. The additional eighteenth
charge is another charge of sexual violence.
12

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL – 2004 – 15 – T, RULING ON THE ISSUE OF REFUSAL OF THE
ACCUSED SESAY AND KALLON TO APPEAR FOR THEIR TRIAL, The Special Court for Sierra Leone (Jan. 19,
2005). Judge determined that the trial will proceed in the absence of Sesay and Kallon, with their
respective defense teams representing their interests in court. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook,
Appendix A, at Tab 16.)
13

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL – 2004 – 15 – T, DECISION ON PROSECUTION REQUEST FOR
LEAVE TO CALL ADDITIONAL WITNESSES AND DISCLOSE ADDITIONAL WITNESS STATEMENTS, The Special
Court for Sierra Leone (Feb. 11, 2005). Justices determined that three additional witnesses could be added
to the witness list because they have relevant testimony with probative value against the accused under the
consolidated indictment. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 17.)

5

his co-conspirators and the case against himself. Part III defines the relevant rules of
evidence from the Special Court and provides a brief comparative analysis to the same or
similar rules from the ICTY and the ICTR.
Part IV talks in greater depth about the first half of the issue, the use of the
testimony against Sesay’s co-conspirators, with comparisons to cases and rulings from
the other tribunals, plus other major common law countries. The United States, Canada,
and Australia were chosen because they are all former British territories, just like Sierra
Leone, and have well-developed judicial systems loosely based on original British law.
Part V discusses the last half of the issue, the use of Sesay’s statements and
testimony against himself, with a comparison to the self-incrimination rules of the other
tribunals and major countries. A brief analysis from South Africa on this issue is also
included because, not only is it also a former British colony, but South Africa offers a
perspective from another African nation.

III.

RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE
All trial and appeals chambers for the SCSL are governed by the Rules of

Procedure and Evidence for the Special Court.14 Rule 89(B) states that when a piece of
evidence is in question, the chamber judge can apply any rules that will result in a fair
trial and ruling, as long as the additional rules are not in contrast with the SCSL’s statute
or general rules of law. 15 As aforementioned, the SCSL’s Rules of Evidence are based
14

Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Rule 89. Rule 89: General
Provisions states:
(A) The rules of evidence set forth in this Section shall govern the proceedings before the
Chambers. The Chambers shall not be bound by the national rules of evidence…
(C) The Chamber may admit any relevant evidence.
(Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 3.)
15
Id. at Rule 89(B).

6

on the Rules of Evidence for the ICTY and the ICTR; therefore, when an evidence
question can not be answered from their own rules, the Special Court can first look to the
other tribunals. 16

A.

Rules of Evidence for the ICTY and the ICTR

Rule 89 in the Rules of Evidence for the ICTY contains three more provisions that
could be helpful in determining the admissibility of evidence. Provisions (A) – (C)
contain almost the exact wording of the SCSL’s Rule 89, but with “relevant evidence”
being further defined to require “probative value.” 17 Provision (D) provides the judge the
right to exclude evidence if it will jeopardize the overall fairness of the trial18 , and the
final provision allows the admittance of written testimony in addition to oral testimony. 19
Additionally, the ICTY’s Rules of Evidence do not contain any rules to exclude hearsay
evidence.
The ICTR’s Rule 89 is more of a mix between the Special Court’s and the ICTY’s
rules. It excludes provisions (D) and (F) from the ICTY Rule 89, but includes provision
(E) (as provision (D)). This new provision (D) states that the Chamber can request that
any evidence offered to the court that was produced outside of the court be verified

16

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL – 2004 – 15 – T, SUMMARY OF DECISION OF THE TRIAL
CHAMBER ON PROSECUTION PRELIMINARY MOTIONS FOR JOINDER, supra n. 3, at ¶¶ 3, 4. The Trial
Chamber repeatedly cites decisions of the ICTY and ICTR as precedent and influence for their decisions,
not just in this decision but in most of the decisions. This instance was just chosen as one example.
17

Rules of Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Rule 89(C), adopted Feb. 11,
1994. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 6.)
18

Id. at Rule 89(D).

19

Id. at Rule 89(F), amended Dec 13, 2000. This rule could become very helpful and necessary if Sesay’s
testimony is in written form, such as a deposition or affidavit. Additionally, as Sesay refuses to attend his
own trial, he would probably be equally as reluctant to stand trial in person to deliver testimony. It is my
interpretation of the issue statement that this most likely is the situation in this case.

7

before it is allowed in. 20 This provision included in both rules states that the judge may
request that any evidence produced outside of court be verified for authenticity.21 These
additions to SCSL’s Rule 89 set precedent for the admittance of outside evidence,
provided that it can be authenticated and has relevant value. 22
Considering the identical nature in the beginnings of Rules 89, the Special Court
can also look to infer the other provisions included in the other tribunals.

These

provisions can be used by the judge of the chamber to determine if all evidence offered
would be beneficial for either or both sides of the case. They would not contradict
SCSL’s Rule 89(B), requiring that the admittance of evidence not violate other principles
of law or the Statute for the SCSL.

B.

Rules of Evidence for the ICC

Another area of influence for the Special Court could be from the recently formed
ICC. The Rules of Evidence adopted for the ICC, however, are based largely on the
Rules of Evidence for the ICTY and the ICTR, and a few written proposals from other
nations, including France and Australia. 23 An Ad Hoc Committee from the U.N. General

20

Rules of Procedure and Evidence for International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rule 89(D), adopted
July 6, 2002. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 7).
21

Id. Provisions (A) – (C) are almost identical to the Special Court’s Rule 89, but with the wording of
ICTY Rule 89 (C).
22

Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR – 97 – 20 – I, DECISION ON THE DEFENCE MOTION FOR
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, RES GESTAE,
HEARSAY AND VIOLATIONS OF THE STATUTE AND RULES OF THE TRIBUNAL, The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 12 (Aug 23, 2000). Trial Chamber III finds that the Chamber can determine the
admissibility of evidence after a party has introduced it to the court, at any time it deems proper, and
consider it with respect to the other evidence offered. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook,
Appendix A, at Tab 22.)
23

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 2001) at 349. (A special mention is given to one of these proposals,

8

Assembly created the statute of the ICC to contain both the definitions of crimes to be
punished and intricate provisions for substantive law matters. 24 This created complete
control over every subject for the ICC, rather than leaving topics open to the judicial
discretions of the judges of the Chambers. 25 It is predicted that as the ICC matures and
utilizes its complex statute and rules, its influence will be felt even at the lowest level of
national courts, and especially for criminal law prosecutions.
For the specific evidentiary issues, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the
ICC state that the chamber judges have the authority to determine the admissibility and
relevance of all evidence presented. 26 The chamber may not require corroboration, nor
impose any national rules of evidence. 27

Therefore, evidence is acceptable and

admissible at the judges’ discretion if they feel it helps develop either side’s arguments.

IV.

ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE BY A CO-CONSPIRATOR AGAINST
HIS OTHER CO-CONSPIRATORS
Even with limited knowledge of the actual testimony the prosecution wants to

present to the court, it can be concluded that evidence proffered by one co-conspirator
against the other conspirators is admissible in court. In common law systems, evidence
offered outside of court by a witness who is not present is considered to be hearsay and

prepared by a Working Group of the American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice.)
(Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 55.)
24

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2001) at 13 - 14.
(Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 56.)

25

Id. at 14.

26

Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Court, Chapter 4, Section I, Rule 63(2).
(Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 5.)
27

Id at Rule 63(4 & 5).

9

usually inadmissible. 28 Testimony is not hearsay if the declarant is available for crossexamination or the statement is made by one of the parties to the case. 29 Therefore, the
hearsay rules do not need to be examined for the use of Sesay’s testimony against himself,
but the testimony he offered against his co-conspirators is most likely hearsay under the
common law definition.

A.

Comparison to Other War Crimes Trials and International Tribunals

Courts have relaxed the strict hearsay rules throughout the history of trying war
crimes. 30 Judges at the Tokyo tribunal after World War II admitted hearsay evidence
based on the reasoning that refusing hearsay is because the evidence can not be tested for
accuracy due to memory loss and observation by cross-examination; but they did not
exclude the testimony because it does not have probative value. 31 Judges at Nuremburg
also accepted hearsay evidence, but with caution and not giving it as much weight as
other testimony. 32
The trial of John Demjanjuk in Israel reshaped hearsay rules for war crimes trials.
Demjanjuk was finally tried in Israel in 1991 for acts of genocide and other war crimes

28

U.S. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). “’Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” (Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 8.)
29

Id. at 801(d).

30

RICHARD MAY AND MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, at 115 – 116 (2002).
(Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 57.)
31
32

Id.
Id.

10

committed during World War II. 33 Israel passed special legislation allowing courts to
depart from the hearsay rule for war crimes trials and trials against humanity. 34 It has
been argued, however, that war crimes trials should be tried with the same rules and
deference given to evidence as would be given under the domestic courts’ jurisdiction. 35
This argument was rejected when testimony from deceased witnesses and other forms of
hearsay evidence were needed for the trial and deemed reliable by the judges. 36 This
case shows, therefore, that hearsay evidence can be used when other evidence or
witnesses may be unavailable, similar to the knowledge Sesay might possess about his
own co-conspirators.

1.

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia

In more modern trials, judges at the ICTY have also ruled on the admissibility of
hearsay. The Chamber sitting for the case against Dućko Tadić ruled that just because a
piece of evidence might be in the nature of hearsay, this does not exclude it from being
admissible evidence. 37 Despite this ruling, the parties continued to make objections to
hearsay evidence but were overruled because the evidence was valid and relevant under

33

Kenneth Mann, Hearsay Evidence in War Crimes Trials, in WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at
351 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996). Due to the passing of 40 years, the judges found need for
leniency in admissible evidence and testimony. Available witnesses and the memory loss of those able to
testify were of great concern after the passing of this much time before Demjanjuk’s trial. (Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 54.)
34

MAY AND WIERDA, supra n. 30, at 115.

35

Mann, supra n. 33, at 377.

36

Id. at 358.

37

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT – 94 – 1 – T, OPINION AND JUDGMENT, International Criminal Tribunal
for Yugoslavia, at ¶ 555 (May 7, 1997). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab
18.)
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Rule 89. 38 These overrulings generated from the same original decision on the use of
probable hearsay evidence. 39
The ICTY’s judges have dismissed all arguments about the inclusion of potential
hearsay testimony, especially in the case against Milosevic.40 As professional judges and
not the average, often uninformed, citizen sitting on a jury, the ICTY judges feel they can
assess all evidence accurately and give it the proper weight. 41

A main reason for

omitting evidence of a hearsay nature in other common law jurisdictions is to not confuse
the jury with information that might not be as accurate or dependable as other evidence
presented in court. 42

2.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The ICTR has also ruled on the relevancy of testimony and evidence. Rule 89(C)
states that the Chamber may allow any evidence which it decides has probative value. 43
Trial Chamber I stated in the case against Nahinana and his co-defendants that the
relevancy of evidence must be assessed differently during each case, taking into

38
39

Id. at ¶ 556.
Id.

40

MICHAEL P. SCHARF AND WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL: A COMPANION, at 87
(2002). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 58.)
41

Id.

42

Id. (The authors note that the fundamental reason behind the hearsay rule in common law systems is to
shield the jury from being unduly influenced by evidence that trained judges would otherwise know as
being unreliable.)

43

Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra n. 20, Rule
89(C).
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consideration the facts and circumstances of each case.44 The prosecution argued that the
statements offered by a specific witness were not reliable and should not be allowed as
evidence. 45 Relying on a previous, but unstated ruling, the Chamber Judges allowed the
statements for impeachment of a witness but not necessarily to prove the actual
statements made. 46

The Chamber judges, therefore, have complete discretion to

determine the admissibility of all offered testimony and evidence.
These rulings are directly relevant to Sesay’s case. Even if his testimony can be
considered hearsay, the other tribunals have determined hearsay evidence can not be
excluded simply because it was a statement made outside of the court. The Chamber
judges only need to deem the evidence offered by either party to have probative value for
the case. Other showings of necessity and reliability would ensure that the Chamber
would allow Sesay’s statements. As a leader of the RUF, Sesay could be privy to
knowledge about his co-conspirators. This knowledge could then lead to a more truthful
fact-finding and proper convictions and sentencing.

B.

Hearsay in the International Criminal Court

The newly formed ICC can be a puzzle to attorneys trained in a common law
system. The ICC allows all relevant and necessary evidence, without any rules excluding

44

Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., DECISION ON THE DEFENCE MOTION TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE
PROSECUTION WITNESS’S STATEMENTS; ALTERNATIVELY TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL DEFENCE WITNESSES,
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Deliberation ¶ 4 (June 5, 2003). (In this decision, the
Chamber allowed documentary evidence during the cross-examination of a witness to prove contradictory
statements.) (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 23.)
45

Id. at Submissions ¶ 2.

46

Id. at Deliberation ¶ 4
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hearsay. 47

When making rulings in the future, judges of the ICC will look to the

truthfulness and trustworthiness of the individual statement, as well as if it was a
voluntary act by the declarant. 48

The ICC will also look to the hearsay exceptions

already used in national legal systems, which sets a standard for other international
tribunals to look towards national legal systems for precedence. The ICC has not tried
any cases yet to make a ruling that can be followed. As previously stated, however, the
ICC will likely become a major influence on criminal law worldwide within a few
years. 49

C.

Hearsay Rules in Major Common Law Countries

Other areas for persuasive authority in international law come from the major
legal systems of the world. In the case against Bagosora, 50 the ICTR ruled on the
admissibility of evidence and the validity of witness testimony and has relied on law from
several prominent countries. Trial Chamber I of the ICTR cited cases from the United
States, Canada, Scotland and England. 51 In support of their motions for expert testimony,
prosecutors have cited to Canadian case law. 52 Another example of extensive citing to

47
48
49

Schabas, supra n. 24, at 115.
Id.
Id.

50

Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR – 98 – 41 – T, DECISION ON MOTION TO COMPEL ACCUSED
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Jan. 11,
2005). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 25.)

TO TESTIFY PRIOR TO OTHER DEFENCE WITNESSES,

51

Id.

52

Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR – 95 – 1 – T, DECISION ON THE PROSECUTION
REQUEST TO RULE INADMISSIBLE THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENCE EXPERT WITNESS, DR. POUGET, International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (June 29, 1998). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A,
at Tab 21.)
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foreign sources is made by the Chamber for the ICTR in another decision for a pretrial
hearing for the case of Bagosora for a decision for the relevancy of admissible
evidence. 53 These cases show that at least one of the other international war crimes
tribunals has set the precedence of relying on domestic law of major common and civil
law countries. 54

1.

United States of America

The United States has a co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule that limits the
admissibility of statements made outside of court. Hearsay is defined as a statement
made by someone other than the witness testifying offered for the proof of the matter at
hand. 55 A co-conspirator's statement qualifies as hearsay and, hence, would only be
admitted if an exception is found. Such a statement is not hearsay if it is made by a coconspirator during the conspiracy and in furtherance of that conspiracy. 56
The courts in the United States have adopted a three prong test to determine if the
statements in question do in fact fall under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule. This test was established by the Federal Court for the Fifth Circuit in the United
States in the case of United States v. James 57 and is subsequently referred to as the James

53

Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR – 98 – 41 – T, DECISION ON THE PROSECUTOR’S MOTION
ADMISSION OF CERTAIN MATERIALS UNDER RULE 89(C), The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (Oct. 14, 2004). This decision cites to ICTY cases, Austrian and Canadian cases, the Canadian
constitution, and Miranda v. Arizona, supra. This reference to Miranda is significant for the following
section of analysis on self-incrimination. The Chamber noted that the defense did not raise an objection to
admission of documents between Rwanda and the U.N., therefore they were admissible as relevant
evidence. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 24.)

FOR THE

54

Id.

55

U.S. FED. R. EVID., supra n. 28, at Rule 801(c).

56

Id. at Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
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test. The party presenting the evidence must prove, independent of the statement itself,
that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) that the declarant and the target of the statement were
both in fact members of this conspiracy, and (3) that the statements offered were made
during and in furtherance of this conspiracy. 58 The judge is the sole determiner of the
admissibility of co-conspirator statements before the evidence can be submitted to the
jury. 59

The standard of proof for determining the admissibility does not extend to

“beyond a reasonable doubt” but requires only that it is “more likely than not” that the
three requirements are met. 60 If the court fails to hold a hearing for the James test, then
the judge must instead make preliminary factual findings regarding the admissibility. 61
Another justification for not allowing a statement of a hearsay nature is the
defendant’s right to confront a witness against him. 62 The Confrontation Clause’s main
objective is to ensure that the testimony is reliable. 63 In Crawford v. Washington, the
Supreme Court of the United States found that the testimony was inadmissible because
the mere fact that the declarant could not be cross-examined is enough to violate the
Sixth Amendment. 64 The Sixth Amendment states that the accused in a criminal trial has
57
58

590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 29.)
Id.

59

Id. at 579. This preliminary hearing is now often referred to as a James hearing, named after this case
that established this precedence.
60

United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978). (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 28.)
61

United States v. Casanova-Gomez, No. 98-2140, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20173, 5 (10th Cir. Aug. 25,
1999). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 33.)
62

U. S. CONST. amend. VI. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 9.)

63

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1370 (2004). (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 34.)
64

Id. at 1374.
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the right to be confronted with all witnesses presented against him. 65 This is relevant
because a similar provision about confronting witnesses is included in the Statute for the
Special Court. 66 A good faith effort must be made to bring all witnesses to court, so that
their statements do not qualify as hearsay and they may be cross-examined. 67
The purpose of cross-examination, and therefore the Confrontation Clause, is to
be sure the witness is telling what he believes is the truth, remembers his observations
accurately, and is satisfied with the language he is using. 68 The Supreme Court of the
United States, in Bourjaily v. United States, 69 holds that the requirements for the
admission of a co-conspirator’s statements are exactly the same as the requirements for
usurping the Confrontation Clause. 70 In the case of United States v. Peralta, the federal
courts upheld the admission of tape-recorded statements by the defendant’s coconspirator for kidnapping and extortion by relying on the ruling in Bourjaily. 71 There
was sufficient independent proof that the conspiracy existed and the admission of the tape
still fell under the co-conspirator exception even though the other suspect was

65

U. S. CONST. amend. VI, supra n. 62.
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Art. 17(4)(e) (Jan. 16, 2002). This provision states that the
accused has the right to examine the witnesses against him or her. (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook, Appendix A, Tab 1.)

66

67

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980). In this case, the prosecution did not breach its duty of good
faith to produce a witness in court, even though they could not find her. This case has also been overruled
in parts by Crawford v. Washington, divorcing the marriage of the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause.
(Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 30.)
68

Id. at 71 (quoting Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal
Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378 (1972)).

69
70

483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 31.)
Id.

71

United States v. Peralta, 941 F.2d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 1991). (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 32.)

17

acquitted. 72 The Supreme Court of the United States in Bourjaily also eliminated the
requirement of Confrontation Clause analysis in co-conspirator testimony situations. 73
Statements made by a co-conspirator are much different than those that could be offered
at trial by a different type of witness, and therefore the testimony is often irreplaceable as
substantive evidence. 74
Sesay’s statements would be acceptable as evidence in a United States’ federal or
state court if the requirements of the co-conspirator exception to hearsay can be met. His
testimony must be about statements made by his co-conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy. 75 Additionally, this conspiracy must be proven. 76 This latter qualification
should be easy to meet, seeing as how the entire RUF uprising and subsequent violations
of law could be seen as a conspiracy against the sitting government of Sierra Leone.
Additionally, the inference that Sesay could provide invaluable insight against his coconspirators is again reinforced by the Court in Bourjaily. This is a significant factor
because it is most directly on point for Sesay’s circumstances.

72

Id. at 1006.
Major Frederic L. Borch III, The Use of Co-conspirator’s Statements Under Rules of Evidence: A
Revolutionary Change in Admissibility 124 MIL. L. REV. 163, 184 (1989). (Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 49.)
73

74

Id. (The author also analyzes a sister case to Bourjaily, United States v. Inadi, which reinforces this
separation between co-conspirator hearsay testimony and the Confrontation Clause.)
75
76

United States v. James, supra n. 57.
Id.
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2.

Canada

Canada has similar hearsay rules as found in the United States. In R. v. Starr, 77
the Supreme Court of Canada relied on the United States’ definition of hearsay for its
opinion. 78 Another similar definition is offered by the same Court in the same case,
citing the late Sir Rupert Cross. 79 Hearsay can also be defined as any assertion other than
one made by a witness presently offering oral testimony made as evidence for the truth of
a fact. 80
Commentators have noted that in the last part of the twentieth century the
Supreme Court of Canada made decisions to relax the strict hearsay rules. 81

They

suggest that Canada is boldly going where no court has gone before by adopting a new
global vision approach to evidence with three justifications: using discretion and
simplifying formulistic rules, reducing stereotypes, and protecting against wrongful
convictions of innocent people. 82

77

2000 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 34, *141. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab
41.)
78

Id. at *141. Although stated in a dissenting opinion, this definition from the United States is still the
definition for hearsay relied on by the Canadian courts, adopted in 1999.
79

Id. at 140, quoting Cross on Evidence, 7th ed. by the late Sir Rupert Cross and Colin Tapper. London:
Butterworths, 1990.

80

Id.

81

David M. Tanovich, Starr Gazing: Looking into the Future of Hearsay in Canada, 28 Queen’s L. J. 371
(2003). The title of this article refers to R. v. Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, where the court ruled to relax the
strict hearsay rules and adopt a more principled approach. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook,
Appendix B, at Tab 52.)

82

Id. at 376. (Tanovich goes on to support this thesis with several recent cases in the Supreme Court of
Canada including R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, R. v. Smith [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, and R. v. Khan [1990]
2 S.C.R. 531, to be discussed in more depth in the body of this analysis.)
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The Supreme Court of Canada stated in R. v. Khan 83 that the hearsay rule has
been a strict, absolute rule with only the noted exceptions, but it no longer can deal with
new situations and new needs in the law. 84 The court poses two qualifications that must
be met with the introduction of out-of-court statements. The hearsay statement must be
necessary and the evidence reliable. 85
Following and broadening this ruling in Khan, the Supreme Court of Canada
ruled in R. v. Smith 86 that the relevance of the statements is the most important factor.
The relevance of the testimony must outweigh the traditional dangers associated with an
out-of-court statement. 87 The Supreme Court of Canada also reinforced that statements,
although of a hearsay nature, could be admissible because they are offered to only prove
that the statement was made, not the truth of the statement, assuming that the fact that
mere making of the statement is relevant. 88
In R. v. Finta, 89 closer on point, the Supreme Court of Canada relaxed hearsay
rules for war crimes trials. 90 The Court restated that admissible hearsay evidence must be

83

[1990] 2 S.C.R. 531. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 36.)

84

Id. at 540. This case involves the hearsay testimony of a child accusing her doctor of sexual assault. The
Court held that the child’s testimony was admissible provided the tests were met and the testimony is given
only the weight that it deserves.

85

Id. at 546 – 547.

86

[1992] 2 S.C.R. 915. A murder trial involving the statements made by the deceased to her mother on the
night she died. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 37.)

87

Id. at 924 – 925.

88

Id. at 925. This is also a valid exception to the hearsay rule in the United States.

89

[1994] 1 S.C.R. 701. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 38.)

90

Id. In this case, Finta is charged with various war crimes and crimes against humanity from the abuse of
Jewish persons detained during World War II. This again is an example of the relaxation of hearsay rules
for not only war crimes trials, but trials for crimes that allegedly occurred several decades beforehand,
similar to the Israeli holding in the Demjanjuk trial (supra).
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necessary and reliable, and defines these terms. Testimony is more reliable when the
declarant is a disinterested party, the statement was made before any litigation began, and
the declarant possesses a particular or special knowledge of the event. 91 Reliability also
concerns external corroboration surrounding the making of the statement, where the
witness’s intelligence and capacity can be used for this validation.92 The Supreme Court
of Canada goes on to say that it is indisputable that the trier of facts needs all relevant,
probative, and reliable evidence. 93 These cases show that although Canada at one point
had strict hearsay rules, it is departing from this norm and adopting more flexible rules in
the interest of justice. 94
In addition to these new relaxed rules on hearsay, Canada also retains the coconspirator exception.

The co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule has barely

changed after the decision of these cases. 95

The co-conspirator exception has been

applied both pre- and post-Khan/Smith rulings, without acknowledging that it might
prove traditional hearsay exceptions still exist in the new principled approach. 96
Evidence of this nature, therefore, can now be admitted either under the traditional
exception it qualifies for or under the new principled approach because it is necessary and
reliable.
91

Id. at 854.

92

Bruce P. Archibald, The Canadian Hearsay Revolution: Is Half a Loaf Better Than No Loaf as All? 25
QUEEN’S L. J. 1, 36 (1999). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 50.)
93

R. v. Finta, supra n. 89, at 855. This case and ruling has been quoted by May in his book as the case that
relaxed the hearsay rules in war crimes and international humanitarian law cases.

94

Archibald, supra n. 92.

95

Id. at 49.

96

Id., relying on R. v. Morrison (G.R.) (1997), 209 A.R. 235 (C.A.); R. v. Jolly, [1995] O.J. No. 1934 (C.A.)
online: QL (OJ); R. v. Buell (1996), 146 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 173 (P.E.I. S.C. (A.D.)); and R. v. Collins and
Collins (1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 8 (Nfld. C.A.).
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This new approach and relaxation of hearsay rules by Canada would be very
beneficial to Sesay’s prosecutors if the case were to come to a similar analysis and
approach as in Canada. Sesay’s statements, even if not appropriate for the co-conspirator
exception, would most likely still be found as helpful and relevant testimony for the case.
The relevance of his testimony, with the first-hand knowledge of working and plotting
along side the accused, would outweigh any of the dangers originally associated with
allowing hearsay evidence.

3.

Australia

Australia is another common law country with a similar hearsay rule and
exception. The definition was stated in R. v. Mbuno 97 by the Federal Court of Appeals
for Victoria that in criminal trials there is a general rule that evidence of what is said or
done by a person not within the presence of the defendant can not be used against him. 98
There is an exception when it is proven that the accused is a member of a conspiracy,
much like the James test of the United States. 99
Similar to the other common law countries, the test described in R. v. Mbuno
requires that to be able to use hearsay testimony from a co-conspirator, the judge must
determine that the defendant was involved in a conspiracy. The judge must determine
there was an agreement between the alleged co-conspirators that the particular crime
should be committed and the actual existence of this agreement plus the accused’s

97

(2003) 7 V.R. 273. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 44.)

98

Id. at ¶ 37.

99

Id. Defendant on trial was part of a drug smuggling operation bringing cocaine into Australia from
Indonesia, therefore qualifying as a member of a conspiracy.

22

involvement in it. 100 The judge must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was in fact a member of a real conspiracy. 101 The Federal Appeals Court for Victoria
goes on to say that the conspiracy must be proven with evidence independent of that
offered by the co-conspirator in R. v. White, R. v. Piggin. 102 Once the trial judge has
sufficiently determined that a conspiracy did exist, the evidence offered must be
statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 103
A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding Sesay’s testimony because Australia
reinforces the same findings in the United States’ and Canadian case law jurisprudence.
The same three requirements must be met as in the United States, and most likely could
be proven by the prosecution. The greatest challenge to the prosecution is if Sesay’s
testimony is about statements or actions made by his co-conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy.

With limited knowledge of the statements Sesay actually gave the

prosecution, it is assumed that a valid argument can be made to prove this requirement.

D.

Direct Co-Conspirator Testimony That Is Not Hearsay

If a co-conspirator’s testimony is oral when he is called to the witness stand
during the trial proceedings, then the hearsay rules do not need to be examined. The coconspirator is present to be cross-examined and can give his own eye-witness accounts.

100

Id. at ¶ 38.

101

Id. If the judge is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt about these aspects of the case, then the
evidence against the defendant can not be brought into evidence.

102

(2003) 7 V.R. 442, ¶ 60. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 45.)

103

Id. (Appellate judge overruled trial judge’s admission of co-conspirator evidence because the
statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.)
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Testimony about a conversation with a third party could still be hearsay, 104 but the
witness’ observations and first-hand knowledge is valid evidence.
A co-defendant testifying against his other co-defendants, however, could present
another problem. A witness may not be present during the testimony of another witness
until he has testified himself. 105 For the co-defendant to be present at his entire trial, he
would need to be either the first witness, or granted permission from the judge to hear the
testimony of witnesses before him. 106
Trial Chamber I of the ICTR was presented with this problem in the case of
Theoneste Bagosora and his co-defendants. 107 The Chamber notes that the prosecution
has not cited any previous cases in the ICTR, but that the ICTY has addressed this
issue. 108 The ICTY determined in a decision for the Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez 109
that the accused may determine when he or she will testify as a witness. 110 The ICTR
also noted in another decision for the case against Bagosora that if the accused were

104

U.S. FED. R. EVID., supra n. 28, at Rule 801(c). “A statement, other than the one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing…”

105

Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra n. 14, at Rule 90(D). A
witness who has not presented his testimony yet may not be present during the questioning of any other
witness unless given special permission by the judge.

106

Id.

107

Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., DECISION ON MOTION TO COMPEL ACCUSED TO TESTIFY PRIOR TO OTHER
DEFENCE WITNESSES, supra n. 50.
108

Id. at ¶ 5.

109

Case No. IT – 95 – 14 / 2, DECISION ON PROSECUTOR’S MOTION ON TRIAL PROCEDURE, International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (Mar. 19, 1999). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix
A, at Tab 19.)

110

Id. Court notes that it is the sole decision of the accused to determine if and when he will testify on his
own behalf.
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forced to testify first to avoid hearing the testimony of other witnesses, this would violate
Rule 85 that lists the order of evidence to be presented in trial. 111
This order of witnesses does not appear to be an issue for Sesay since he has not
become an actual witness for the prosecution.

His statements, whether considered

hearsay or not, would need to meet the requirements of the Rules of Evidence for the
Special Court. For example, if the prosecution offered a signed affidavit by Sesay, it
would need to be valid as non-oral testimony according Rule 92bis. 112 Rule 92bis states
that it is the Chamber’s discretion to admit information as evidence, and they must base
their decision on the relevance and reliability of its authentication. 113 Regardless of
whether Sesay’s statements could be considered hearsay or not, evidence rules in
international law should not bar the prosecutor from using his testimony against his coconspirators.

V.

ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE BY A CO-CONSPIRATOR AGAINST
HIMSELF
Testimony given by a defendant himself when not on the witness stand is

admissible if it was not coerced or compelled, and he knew of the right against self-

111

Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., supra n. 50. Rule 85 states that the prosecution presents their evidence
before the defense. This distinguishes the ruling from Sesay’s case because Sesay would be a witness for
the prosecution. Even though these cases find that Sesay could determine when he wanted to testify on his
own behalf, he could be the first witness for the prosecution against his co-conspirators to avoid this
complication.

112

Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra n. 14, at Rule 92bis. This
rule oversees the admission of written evidence in lieu of oral testimony by a witness on the stand, and will
not be discussed in depth in this analysis. This issue is addressed in an entirely separate memorandum for
the Office of the Prosecutor of the Special Court of Sierra Leone by Bridgit Henry from Case Western
Reserve School of Law, submitted at the same time as this one.

113

Id.
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incrimination when he waived it. The prosecution still has to meet all other necessary
rules specified by the SCSL for the judge to admit non-oral testimony. 114
The self incrimination provision for the SCSL is in Article 17 of the Statute for
the Special Court. It simply states that the accused shall not be compelled to testify
against himself or confess. 115 A witness may testify on his own on behalf, but is not
required to do so. 116 Additionally, a testifying witness, whether the defendant of the case
or not, can refuse to make any comment that may be found incriminating towards him. 117
No special exceptions are made for the defendant as a witness, or testimony entered made
prior by the defendant.

A.

Comparison to Other War Crimes Trials and International Tribunals

The Rules of Evidence for the ICTY and the ICTR contain the same selfincrimination clause as the Special Court. 118 Chamber I sitting for the ICTR made a
decision on Rule 90(E) in the case against Jean-Paul Akayesu. 119 The Chamber found
that the testimony of other accused persons would be beneficial evidence about the events
114

Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra n. 14, at Section 3.

115

Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra n. 66, at Art. 17(g).

116

Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra n. 14, at Rule 85(C).

117

Id. at Rule 90(E). (“A witness may refuse to make any statement which might tend to incriminate him.
The Chamber may, however, compel the witness to answer the question. Testimony compelled in this way
shall not be used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution against the witness for any offence other than
false testimony under solemn oath.”)
118

Rules of Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra n. 17, at Rule 90(E);
Rules of Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, supra n. 20, at Rule 90(E). (The only
difference in wording comes at the very end when the offense becomes “perjury” for Rwanda and just
“false testimony” for Yugoslavia, and not “false testimony under solemn oath” for the Special Court.)

119

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR – 96 – 4 – T, DECISION ON A MOTION FOR SUMMONSES AND
PROTECTION OF WITNESSES CALLED BY THE DEFENSE, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Feb. 17,
1998). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 20.)
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that led to the charges against the defendant. 120 The Chamber went on to say, however,
that the prejudice this testimony could cause against the other accused persons outweighs
the need for their testimony and violates Rule 90(E) of the Rules of Evidence of the ICTR
and Article 20 (4)(g) of the Statute of the ICTR. 121 The Tribunal is also following Article
14(3)(g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, where it states that it
is a common human right to all people to not be compelled to testify against himself. 122
Sesay could be compelled to testify against himself if he made statements that he
was unaware could be used against him. Although not physically forced to testify or
threatened in any way, Sesay did not agree to have his statements used as evidence
against himself. He may have been unaware of the privilege against self-incrimination,
and therefore not have waived his right when he gave his statements.

B.

Self-incrimination in the International Criminal Court

One of the rights of the accused in the ICC is to not be compelled to testify
against himself or confess, and to remain silent, where this act of silence is not to be
taken as a sign of guilt. 123 The Court may refuse any evidence not obtained in a manner
consistent with the Rome Statute and other rules of the ICC. 124 Again, as with the

120

Id. at page 2.

121

Id. (Article 20 (4)(g) of the Statute of the ICTR states that “the accused shall be entitled… not to be
compelled to testify against himself or herself or confess guilt.”)

122

Id. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is discussed further in Section III. C(3)(c).

123

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 67(1)(g), July 17, 1998. (Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 4.)

124

Id. at Art. 69(4).
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hearsay comparison, the ICC has not heard any cases nor made any rulings to set
precedence.

C.

Self-incrimination Rules in Major Common Law Countries
1.

United States of America

In the United States, the accused in a criminal trial has the right to not be
compelled by the prosecution to be a witness against himself. 125 The Fifth Amendment
states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 126 A
person has not had these Fifth Amendment rights violated unless the statements he made
are used against him in a criminal proceeding. 127
The Supreme Court of the United States defined “criminal proceeding,” specified
in this privilege, in Counselman v. Hitchcock 128 as not necessarily the one that the
testimony is given during, but any subsequent criminal case during which the testimony
could be used. This Court also defined “incriminating” as any evidence that will tend to
show that the declarant witness had committed a crime himself. 129

125
126

U. S. CONST. amend. V, supra n. 62.
Id.

127

Lt. Col. David H. Robertson, Self-incrimination: Changes in the Wind 2004 ARMY LAW. 37, 38 (2004).
(Commenting on the case of Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), a civil case where Martinez claimed
his Fifth Amendment rights were violated even though no criminal charge was filed against him and the
statements were never used. The Supreme Court held that even in this civil proceeding, the defendant
could not be compelled to be a witness against himself.) (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook,
Appendix B, at Tab 53.)
128

142 U.S. 547 (1892). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 26.)

129

Id. at 562. (In this case, the Court granted the self-incrimination right to all witnesses, even those at a
grand jury investigation.)
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The landmark case for self-incrimination is Miranda v. Arizona. 130 In this case,
the Supreme Court of the United States determined that a suspect must be made aware of
his right to remain silent, that if he does not remain silent his statements will be used
against him, and that the suspect has the right to counsel. 131 The Court in Miranda also
reinforces that a confession or statement is not voluntarily made merely because the
declarant was not compelled by a threat or promise. 132 Therefore, the ruling here is not
novel, but a new application of being informed of the defendant’s rights to custodial
interrogations before the actual criminal begins. 133
Violations of giving a suspect his Miranda rights occur only when the admission
of unwarned statements are introduced as evidence. 134

Statements made without a

sufficient warning of these rights are considered to be compelled or coerced but only to
protect the privilege of self-incrimination.135
Miranda does not necessarily apply to Sesay’s case. From the few facts that are
known, Sesay offered his testimony well after the criminal proceedings against him had
commenced. The statements the prosecution would like to use, therefore, were not made
by Sesay during an interrogation before he was indicted, nor were they made specifically
130

384 U.S. 436 (1966). (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 27.)

131

Id. at 491.

132

Id. at 462, quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). (The Miranda Court stated that the
issue of self-incrimination was settled by this case 70 years before.)

133

Id. at 442.

134

United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2629 (2004). The evidence in this case consisted of the
admissibility of the gun in the possession of a convicted felon, which is a crime. The defendant interrupted
the officer who was trying to inform him of his rights, but then tried to suppress the gun from evidence
because it was used against him in a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court ruled
that the gun was admissible evidence because the defendant waived his rights. (Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 35.)
135

Id. at 2630.
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about himself as a confession.

However, Miranda does apply in the fact that the

prosecution needed to inform Sesay of his rights and that by testifying he would be
waiving this right and his statements could be used against him. As aforementioned, the
ICTR has specifically cited to Miranda, in decisions for Bagosora among others, thus
showing its relevance in not only the United States but in international law. 136

2.

Canada

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the right of someone
charged with an offense to not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a trial or
proceeding for that particular offense. 137 Whereas a witness in the Special Court can
refuse to answer a question that may incriminate him, a witness in Canadian courts will
not be excused from answering a similar question. 138 Any answer this witness gives,
however, may not be used against him in a civil or criminal case, unless the charge is
perjury. 139
The act of coercion is often difficult to identify, but the Supreme Court of Canada
has offered a definition in sexual assault case of R. v. Jones. 140 Coercion is when the
state or prosecuting party denies the accused the chance to give free and informed
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Prosecutor v. Bagosora, supra note 50.

137

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(c), Apr. 17, 1982. (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 10.)
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Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 5(1); 1997. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook,
Appendix A, at Tab 11.)
139

Id. at s. 5(2).

140

[1994] 2 S.C.R. 229. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 39.)
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consent. 141 The defendant here was not informed that his statements made to a doctor
could be used in a different trial relating to his status as a dangerous offender. 142 The
warning that his statements could be used against him in court proceedings was not
specific enough to inform him that the authorities meant more than just the current rape
trial. 143
Canada uses a broad definition of incrimination, also defined by the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Jones. Evidence that may be incriminating does not only have
to expose the declarant as guilty to criminal charges, but can also expose him to penalty
or forfeiture, nor can it increase the penalty if the defendant has already been
sentenced. 144 The rationales for the self-incrimination privilege include the need for
protection against unreliable confessions and protection of the accused against the state
abusing their power. 145
The Supreme Court of Canada has also stated that principles of fundamental
justice protect the privilege against self-incrimination. 146

These principles are most

141

Id. at 249. This case involves a convicted rapist who was unaware statements made to a psychologist
may be used in determining if he could be classified as a dangerous offender. He was informed; however,
that any statement made to the psychologist could be used against him in his court proceedings. The
Supreme Court of Canada found that the statements made to the psychiatrist were not admissible in the
defendant’s dangerous offender hearing.
142
143
144

Id.
Id.
Id. at 250.
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Id. (The Supreme Court of Canada speaks extensively about the privilege against self-incrimination in
this case. Included in this analysis is only a brief summary of their rulings. From this extensive discussion,
it is obvious that Canada places a great emphasis and has a high regard for the privilege against selfincrimination.)
146

R. v. Brown, 2002 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 34, 64 (March 28, 2002). (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 42.)
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generally stated in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 147 In a
judicial ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada expands Section 7 to give the accused a
privilege against self-incrimination that might not otherwise be specifically stated in the
Charter or the Canada Evidence Act. 148 The Supreme Court of Canada extended the
definition further when it stated that this is a broad, far-reaching principle deeply rooted
in common law that is a fundamental justice for all citizens of Canada in the case of R. v.
P. (M.B.). 149
These broad interpretations may be evidence that the Canadian self-incrimination
privilege would apply to co-conspirator testimony. 150 If Sesay was not aware of his
rights against making statements that might be used against himself, these statements
should not be admissible as testimony in his ongoing trial.

3.

Australia

Australia is another common law country that also has a privilege against selfincrimination. Section 14(2) of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 as amended by the
Royal Commissions Act Amendment Act 1982 states the privilege against self-

147

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 137, at s. 7. “Everyone has the right to life,
liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.”
148

R. v. Brown, supra note 146, at 65.
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R. v. P. (M.B.) [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555, 577. “Perhaps the single most important organizing principle in
criminal law is the right of an accused not to be forced into assisting in his or her own prosecution.”
(Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 40.)
150

Id. The Supreme Court of Canada has placed a great emphasis on the privilege against selfincrimination, and this is just one example of such a ruling. With this emphasis, it can only be assumed
that the Supreme Court of Canada would also enforce a strict test and few exceptions.
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incrimination bans the use of statements that could show guilt made by witness in a civil
or criminal proceeding against him. 151
The High Court of Australia stated in Sorby v. Commonwealth that the privilege
against self-incrimination is based on principle. 152

It is a primary principle in the

Australian justice system that the prosecution must find the defendant guilty without
abusing their power and using statements that the defendant might have been compelled
to give in other testimony. 153 This Court also refers to the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America as proof of this standard privilege for all
common law countries. 154
Australia has extended the privilege of self-incrimination to derivative evidence
obtained using statements otherwise protected by the right against self-incrimination. 155
It has been argued that there can be no exception to the privilege against selfincrimination unless provided for in a statute. 156 The Australian Crime Commission Act
is a much contested statute, but the Federal Court of Australia has determined that it does
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As quoted in Sorby v. Commonwealth of Australia (1983) 46 A.L.R. 237. (Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 43.)
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Sorby v. Commonwealth, supra note 151.
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Id. (Pinpoint cite to page 6 of the attached printout, but no page numbers given in the original
document.)
154

Id. (The High Court of Australia refers to Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, for a definition and
application of the self-incrimination privilege.)
155

Pathways Employment Services v. West (2004) 212 A.L.R. 140. (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 47.)

156

Id. at ¶ 11, quoting Reid v. Howard (1995) 184 C.L.R. 1, 14. (It is argued that Section 128 of the
Evidence Act 1995 of New South Wales abrogates the privilege of self-incrimination. It is noted at ¶ 33
that this statutory language only applies to a proceeding in a New South Wales court, and also offers
protection against the use of evidence information which would also qualify for protection under the selfincrimination principle. The question becomes whether or not the evidence may be used in Federal Court,
and the Supreme Court of New South Wales determined that Section 128 was not meant to apply. )
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not eliminate the privilege in the case of A v. Boulton. 157 A statute can only abrogate this
privilege when there is a greater public interest that requires the need for the admission of
true facts. 158 In 2004, the Federal Court of Australia found that any elimination of this
privilege would be unconstitutional. 159
The Federal Court of Australia has found that the privilege is not just a mere rule
of evidence, but a rule of law. 160 The Federal Court also acknowledges that it is a
privilege recognized in international human rights law, codified at Article 14(3)(g) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 161 This Article states that all people
should be equal before the courts and tribunals regardless of nationality and other
characteristics and afforded basic civil rights, which includes the right against selfincrimination. 162
Australia appears to have stricter requirements for the privilege against selfincrimination. The Federal Court of Australia shows the importance placed on this right
by mentioning international human rights in domestic cases. 163 For the statements made
157

(2004) 204 A.L.R. 598. (The Australian Crime Commission Act allows for the collection of all relevant
information to construct a national intelligence database. Defendants have relied on the privilege of selfincrimination when answering questions from the commission.) (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook, Appendix B, at Tab 46.)
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Id. at ¶ 21.
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Id. at ¶ 43. (This ruling has overruled the High Court of Australia’s finding that parliament could pass a
statute that validly eliminates the self-incrimination privilege.)
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Id. at ¶ 20.
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Id. Australia is a signatory to this treaty, as is Sierra Leone who ratified it on November 23, 1996.
Article 14(3)(g) states that “[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality … (g) Not to be compelled to testify against
himself or to confess guilt.” (Information on ratification found at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.)
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 UNTS 171,art. 14.
(Reproduced in the accompanying notebook, Appendix A, at Tab 12.)
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A v. Boulton, supra note 157.
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by Sesay to be used against him, these strict aforementioned requirements would have to
be met. Even other evidence the prosecution gathered based on his statements would not
be admissible due to the derivative evidence rule. 164 The prosecution would have to have
advised Sesay of his rights and Sesay would have had to have waived these rights for the
testimony to be admissible.

4.

South Africa

The citizens of South Africa have the right against self-incrimination, also based
on the original English common law definition. 165 The High Court of South Africa stated
in the case of Dilworth v. Reichard that a co-conspirator who offers testimony against
another co-conspirator for the same crimes will not be entitled to claim the privilege
against self-incrimination. 166 The Court goes on to note that in the present case, the
preservation of such a privilege is entirely in the defendant’s own control with no outside
coercion. 167 This is directly relevant to Sesay’s case because it is not apparent that he
was compelled to offer his testimony in anyway, and the evidence he offered was
relevant for the crimes he is personally charged with.

164

Id.

165

Dilworth v. Reichard, 2003 (4) BCLR 388 (W), *15. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook,
Appendix B, at Tab 48.)
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Id. at 39 – 40. Two men were arrested for the same murder, and the wrong one was charged and
convicted. In this case, the wrongfully accused man brought the real killer to court for the truth to be found.
The included the fact that the defendant knew the truth that he was the murderer, and could not testify
truthfully without incriminating himself.
167

Id. at 42.
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IV.

CONCLUSION
In international criminal law, acts and declarations of a co-conspirator are

admissible as evidence against both his other co-conspirators and himself. Sources of
international law, the international war crimes tribunals and the International Criminal
Court, do not have hearsay rules of evidence. In common law countries, out of court
statements made by someone other than the witness testifying or documents made are
considered hearsay. There is a well accepted exception to the hearsay rule that coconspirator testimony is admissible. Therefore, even if the Special Tribunal had hearsay
rules, Sesay’s testimony would be admissible. The Chamber has the discretion to allow
any relevant testimony into evidence.
If Sesay chooses to become a witness at the trial against his co-conspirators, then
hearsay rules are not a concern. The Special Court’s rule stating that a witness may not
be in the courtroom for any other witness’ testimony until he has given his statements
would not apply. Sesay could either be the first witness to testify because he is a witness
for the prosecution, or he could follow the ICTR’s decision that the defendant can
determine for himself when he would like to testify.
A co-conspirator’s testimony is also admissible against himself if it was not
coerced or compelled. Coerced has been defined as anything involuntary. With the few
facts given, it seems as though Sesay offered his testimony to the prosecution voluntarily
to be used against his co-conspirators.

If he was aware of his rights against self-

incrimination, then he should have known that his statements could also be used in his
own trial. In conclusion, all of Sesay’s testimony should be admissible as evidence if the
specified requirements are met.
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